Pošta i kurirske službe - SMS i E-mail prevare

[milos_rs]

Ponestaje im ideja, sada se ide na Ghana Post

   

ghanapost .lol/LjJ5p


sve je klasika...


   

pa traži lične podatke isto kao i na svakom ovom sranju

pa traži karticu:

   

[milos_rs]

   

espoatse .top/rs

   

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posta-srbije.com has address 91.229.239.94

opet AlexHost kao provajder viđao sam ga i ranije za pošta scam, poznat Moldavski provajder koji mnogi prevaranti koriste jer nudi "Offshore DMCA ignored hosting".

na sajtu se ništa ne javlja kako god da sam probao:

   

[facyber_]

Najbolje od svega je što sam video da ako nešto odgovorite na poruku, dobićete odgovor nazad na tečnom i lepom srpkom.

[milos_rs]

   

Code:

postarsusa.sbs has address 129.226.159.166

[Petar]

Malicious domains/URLs

hxxps[://]postarsusa[.]sbs/rs/
hxxps[://]postarscsa[.]top/rs/
hxxp[://]postarswsa[.]top/rs/
postasrb[.]buzz
postaras[.]ink
rss[.]rspost-zip[.]click
srbsposta[.]vip


Search by icon: https://urlscan.io/search/#filename:%225...SM8.svg%22

[milos_rs]

dobra fora search by icon

ovi su stariji:

   

   

[milos_rs]

Odličan članak o tome kako neke od ovih prevara funkcionišu i kako dolazi do krađe platne kartice i trošenja novca sa istih :

How Phished Data Turns into Apple & Google Wallets

These messages are being sent through sophisticated phishing kits sold by several cybercriminals based in mainland China. And they are not traditional SMS phishing or “smishing” messages, as they bypass the mobile networks entirely. Rather, the missives are sent through the Apple iMessage service and through RCS, the functionally equivalent technology on Google phones.

People who enter their payment card data at one of these sites will be told their financial institution needs to verify the small transaction by sending a one-time passcode to the customer’s mobile device. In reality, that code will be sent by the victim’s financial institution to verify that the user indeed wishes to link their card information to a mobile wallet.

If the victim then provides that one-time code, the phishers will link the card data to a new mobile wallet from Apple or Google, loading the wallet onto a mobile phone that the scammers control.

For example, a would-be smishing victim might enter their personal and financial information, but then decide the whole thing is scam before actually submitting the data. In this case, anything typed into the data fields of the phishing page will be captured in real time, regardless of whether the visitor actually clicks the “submit” button.

Merrill said people who submit payment card data to these phishing sites often are then told their card can’t be processed, and urged to use a different card. This technique, he said, sometimes allows the phishers to steal more than one mobile wallet per victim.

the smishing websites are powered by real human operators as long as new messages are being sent. Merrill said the criminals appear to send only a few dozen messages at a time, likely because completing the scam takes manual work by the human operators in China. After all, most one-time codes used for mobile wallet provisioning are generally only good for a few minutes before they expire.

Notably, none of the phishing sites spoofing the toll operators or postal services will load in a regular Web browser; they will only render if they detect that a visitor is coming from a mobile device.

“One of the reasons they want you to be on a mobile device is they want you to be on the same device that is going to receive the one-time code,” Merrill said. “They also want to minimize the chances you will leave. And if they want to get that mobile tokenization and grab your one-time code, they need a live operator.”

[milos_rs]

   

is .gd/ZQ2Z5O ide na posta .cfd/rs

[milos_rs]

Kod komšija u .hr slični problemi:

   

cela objava na LinkedIn-u

[milos_rs]

   

link je ugašen, ne radi.