09-24-2022, 03:16 PM (This post was last modified: 09-24-2022, 03:16 PM by 1van.)
Quote:In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
Quote:Source Address Validation issues inferred during Aug 2022:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
8400 TELEKOM 2020-12-11 2022-08-05
Morali bi vremenom da svi krenu da koriste RPKI i druge opcije za sprecavanje BGP leak/spoofing. Ne znam puno (vrlo blizu nista) o BGP-u ali mi je jasna uloga RPKI potpisa u BGP oglasavanju
Quote:In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within srb.
Inferred improvements during Nov 2022:
none inferred
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Nov 2022:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
33983 ARTMOTION 2016-08-22 2022-11-28