BGP Spoofing Report

[1van]

In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.

Source Address Validation issues inferred during Aug 2022:

ASN    Name                          First-Spoofed     Last-Spoofed
8400  TELEKOM                     2020-12-11        2022-08-05

Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.p...no_block=1

[y0d4]

odlican servis, respect!

Jel moze on ili neki drugi servis, koji ima neki history, da se vidi ko je source koji je pokusao spoof?

[1van]

Možda @smarkovic ima više info ili kontakt, ovo sam video na RSNOG mejl listi.

[Aleksandar.Dj.]

Morali bi vremenom da svi krenu da koriste RPKI i druge opcije za sprecavanje BGP leak/spoofing. Ne znam puno (vrlo blizu nista) o BGP-u ali mi je jasna uloga RPKI potpisa u BGP oglasavanju

[1van]

In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.

This report summarises tests conducted within srb.

Inferred improvements during Nov 2022:
none inferred

Source Address Validation issues inferred during Nov 2022:
ASN    Name                          First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
33983  ARTMOTION                        2016-08-22  2022-11-28

Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.p...no_block=1

[1van]

Inferred improvements during Dec 2022:
none inferred

Source Address Validation issues inferred during Dec 2022:
ASN    Name                          First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
33983  ARTMOTION                        2016-08-22  2022-12-06

Detallji: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.p...no_block=1

[1van]

Usput evo i jednog korisnog alata za testiranje bezbednosti BGP servisa ISP-a koji koristite: https://isbgpsafeyet.com/.

[1van]

This report summarises tests conducted within srb.

Inferred improvements during Feb 2023:
none inferred

Source Address Validation issues inferred during Feb 2023:
ASN    Name                          First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
33983  ARTMOTION                        2016-08-22  2023-02-28

[1van]

This report summarises tests conducted within srb.

Inferred improvements during Apr 2023:
none inferred

Source Address Validation issues inferred during Apr 2023:
ASN    Name                          First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
33983  ARTMOTION                        2016-08-22  2023-04-04

Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.p...no_block=1

[1van]

This report summarises tests conducted within srb.

Inferred improvements during May 2023:
none inferred

Source Address Validation issues inferred during May 2023:
ASN    Name                          First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
33983  ARTMOTION                        2016-08-22  2023-05-22

Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.p...no_block=1