02-26-2023, 05:43 PM
Quote:In our previous threat reporting, we called out the rise of domestic influence operations, which are particularly concerning when they combine deceptive techniques with the real-world power of a state. The three CIB networks we removed last quarter — in Serbia, Cuba, and Bolivia — continued this trend and were in some way linked to governments or ruling parties in their respective countries. Each targeted domestic populations to praise the government and criticize the opposition.
We took action against a CIB network in Serbia linked to employees of the Serbian Progressive Party, known as its Internet Team, and state employees from around Serbia. They targeted domestic audiences across many internet services, including Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, in addition to local news media to create a perception of widespread and authentic grassroots support for Serbian President Aleksander Vučić and the Serbian Progressive party.
Link: https://about.fb.com/news/2023/02/metas-...t-q4-2022/, arhivirano: https://archive.ph/QtpPM.
“If you think you are too small to make a difference, try sleeping with a mosquito.” - Dalai Lama XIV