Quote:Serbia’s Social Card law was supposed to make the welfare system fairer and more transparent. It is doing the exact opposite.

...

The legislation prescribes the establishment of a “Social Card” – a centralised electronic record of the social and economic status of individuals (applicants and beneficiaries of the social welfare aid) and of persons related to them.

The system processes around 130 different types of data on individuals, automatically collecting them from other registers handled by public authorities, such as the Tax Administration or Ministry of Interior.

NGOs and human rights activists monitoring the implementation of the law, as well as legally assisting those in need, say the new system dehumanizes the social welfare application process, as it introduces the use of an algorithm that determines the eligibility of applicants.

Moreover, the system is not accessible to the public, even after NGOs made several attempts to access the algorithm, its source code, or at least its logic. It is therefore almost impossible to secure any kind of oversight and scrutiny.

This lack of transparency in the decision-making process is also undermining the applicants’ right to appeal and challenge decisions on welfare aid since they are not informed of the underlying logic and legal ground of the decision.

Having in mind that the beneficiaries of social support mostly come from vulnerable groups who generally lack the resources to engage in complex and rigid administrative proceedings, the Social Card system inflicts most harm on those who are already marginalized in society, such as Roma or persons with disabilities.

Their access to support services has become even more complex, and their only source of assistance is local NGOs, also struggling with a lack of human and financial resources and with the generally shrinking space for civil society in Serbia.

Pressures are coming not only from the state’s side but from the Bar Association as well; it has been targeting members who provide free legal aid through NGOs.

Apart from restricting citizens’ right to social security, the Social Card system endangers citizens’ privacy and data protection rights, introducing automatization of the processes in social welfare without respecting basic data protection principles, most of all data minimization and purpose limitation.

...

Ceo tekst: https://balkaninsight.com/2023/07/25/doo...t-exposed/

Quote:Nevena Ružić, ekspertkinja za zaštitu podataka o ličnosti, koja je godinama radila analize o pitanjima upotrebe video nadzora u kancelariji Poverenika za dostupnost informacija i zaštitu podataka o ličnosti, kaže da su se u Srbiji koja je motrila na "velikog brata, desile male sestre". 

Praktično dok su svi gledali kakve aranžmane država sklapa sa kineskom kompanijom Huavej, na ulice su postavljene kineske Dahua kamere. 

Ružić podseća da oblast javnog video nadzora nije adekvatno uređena zakonom i ističe da u takvim okolnostima veliki problem predstavlja činjenica da ovu opremu nabavljaju opštine i gradovi, koji nemaju jasno definisane nadležnosti u vezi sa nadzorom.

"Javna bezbednost, sprečavanje krivičnih dela, otkrivanje počinilaca krivičnih dela su poslovi kojima se ne bavi niko osim Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova", naglašava Nevena Ružić.

Ceo tekst: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/video-n...07504.html.

I povezano: "The tech flaw that lets hackers control surveillance cameras".

Izvor: https://twitter.com/milos_rs_/status/168...0204640260

Quote:People’s ever-stronger reliance on digital technologies and devices has caused states and private actors to increasingly reach for various systems and tools for the digital surveillance of citizens. Consequently, high-resolution cameras, artificial intelligence, programmes for biometric recognition, tools for automatic data collection from the Internet, and intrusive software for monitoring mobile phones have become the everyday reality of people worldwide.

The spread of digital surveillance in Serbia is highly non-transparent, and especially dangerous since Serbia has been assessed as a captured state characterised by the abuse of state resources for the sake of personal and party interests. Although the reports by the media and investigative journalists are important, they are focused on individual cases, which makes it difficult to get a broader picture of the scale of the digital surveillance problem in Serbia based on them.

Link: https://bezbednost.org/en/publication/di...in-serbia/.

Quote:Koliko puta ste čuli da ne objavljujete svoje i fotografije dece na društvenim mrežama, a onda odete na nečiji profil i vrlo brzo možete sve da saznate o njemu. Stručnjak za zaštitu podataka o ličnosti Ana Toskić Cvetinović upozorava koje su najveće opasnosti naše privatne "izloženosti" na internetu i kako se najbolje zaštititi od zloupotreba.

Toskić Cvetinović ističe da je prostor zloputrebe fotografija kao i ličnih podataka veliki, ali da su sa „novim razvojem veštačke inteligencije fotografije postale posebno osetljive“.

„Prostor je veliki zato što svi mi samostalno postavljamo dosta sadržaja na internetu o nama, našim životima. Onoga čega uglavnom nismo svesni, jeste da postavljamo sadržaje i o drugima i to je možda ono gde leži najveća opasnost. Postavljamo tuđe fotografije bez saglasnosti tih ljudi, postavljamo dosta sadržaja o maloletnim licima, odnosno našoj deci, a da nismo svesni da to što jednom postavimo tu ostaje trajno“, objasnila je Toskić Cvetinović za portal N1.

Ceo tekst: https://n1info.rs/magazin/scitech/vise-l...a-mrezama/.

Quote:Cybersecurity experts say Serbian state bodies and public enterprises are failing to act on indications that the email credentials of their employees are being sold on the dark net.

Late last year, reports surfaced in the online forum ‘Bezbedan Balkan’ [Secure Balkan] concerning the black market sale of email account credentials associated with a number of Serbian state institutions and public companies.

“Multiple sources” reported the phenomenon, said Ivan Markovic, a cybersecurity experts and co-founder of the forum.

“This means that someone, for the right price, was able to read through the official communication of the public enterprise Elektroprivreda Srbije [Serbia’s power utility] or [main gas distributor] Srbijagas, or send a message pretending to be from the National Employment Service,” Markovic told BIRN.

Ceo tekst: https://balkaninsight.com/2023/07/27/for...ld-online/

Razotkrivena hakerska grupa koja stoji iza sajber napada u Rusiji i Srbiji

Space Pirates: a look into the group's unconventional techniques, new attack vectors, and tools

   

Zdravo, dobio sam danas prijavu za girosplusbeograd[.]rs.

Neki CyberSecurity proizvodi ga maskiraju kao maliciznog, tj. prijavljuju da je na bleklisti jer je ranije (2022 godine) (ne znam čijom krivicom, ne znam jel hakovan bio) imao maliciozni web elemente:

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/82dbb.../detection

https://threatbook.io/domain/girosplusbeograd.rs

Ranije detektovanje maliciozni fajlovi se mogu videti na Threatbook URL-u iznad.
jquery-migrate.min.js -> https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/23bf...14/details
i
wp-embed.min.js -> https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9503...1c/details
Koji se sa UrlQuery Alena mogu naći lako:https://urlquery.net/report/0c82ed20-4eed-4cdd-a8de-bbd0fc8918ac
Da je na lokaciji:
https://girosplusbeograd.rs/wp-includes/...ate.min.js
dok drugi više ne postoji.
Ovaj sto je prisutan više nije maliciozan:

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b60a...8cd7be3e33
Siteguardian posle skeniranja prikazuje da je zbog raznih vendora sajt označen kao maliciozan:
   

Pa tako McAfee kaže da ga označava zbog PUP-a (potentially unwanted programs)
   

Dok Fortinet ima istoriju gde se presuda menjala tokom 2022e godine:
    .

Ja nisam našao sada ništa maliciozno, tako da ne bude da samo hudimo, međutim ako neko pronađe nešto što mi je promaklo neka prijavi.
Moje mišljenje je da sajt jeste imao maliciozni elemente tokom vremena i da je zato dospeo na blekliste ali da je sada čist.
Nemam afilijacije prema istom, samo proveravam što ljudi prijave da ih ispostujem.

Pozdrav.

šta prodaje:

   

o "prodavcu":

   

navodno ovo je izvesni Aleksandar Isirinović https://www.kurir.rs/vesti/politika/3956...za-zastitu

Moje mišljenje je da je ovo verovatno baza iz Agencije za privatizaciju koja je procurela 2014. a sadrži podatke građana koji su se 2008. prijavili za besplatne akcije. Izvučeni samo ljudi sa BG adresom, ne verujem da je novi breach. (https://resursi.sharefoundation.info/sr/...na-srbije/)

izvori:

https://twitter.com/EkoStraza/status/168...5892064256

https://www.reddit.com/r/serbia/comments...odatka_sa/

Obaveštenje o sprovođenju javne rasprave o Nacrtu zakona o informacionoj bezbednosti

Hoćemo neki kolektivni komentar kao zajednica?

Quote:Inicijative, predlozi, sugestije i komentari dostavljaju se Ministarstvu informisanja i telekomunikacija, putem elektronske pošte, od početka javne rasprave, a najkasnije do 30. avgusta 2023. godine, na adresu: [email protected] ili pisanim putem na adresu Ministarstvo informisanja i telekomunikacija, Nemanjina 22-26, 11000 Beograd.

Nacrt ZIB 2023- za javnu raspravu https://mit.gov.rs/extfile/sr/2357/Nacrt...pravu.docx

Obrazloženje ZIB https://mit.gov.rs/extfile/sr/2360/%D0%9...%D0%91.DOC